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 In the last decade, online sphere has been extensively 
transformed while going through the other dimension of development.  
The Web 2.0 idea where people can be more actively involved on the site 
has been materialized through invention of a novel online platform such 
as microblog or Social Network Sites (e.g., Myspace, Tumblr, Facebook 
and Twitter).  Social network sites (SNSs) play the most pivotal role in 
changing people's contemporary lifestyle and exercise a remarkable 
impact on the events of the real world.  Clearly the performance in 
civic engagement through social network sites is also very impressive 
and uniquely Twitter has been regarded as a key.  In this study, I 
examine how ideological polarization among users has changed over 
time in Twitter by data mining and network analysis. Here I analyze 
followership between legislators and users and then compare the extent 
of political polarization and concentration in the respective years.  The 
results show ideological polarization and concentration in Twitter has 
been more or less alleviated over time although its extent of change is 
very small.  The result also indicates the liberal users are more likely to 
follow liberal legislators.  Furthermore this liberal's like-minded 
followership is found to get distinctively bigger as time goes on.  The 
findings suggest users in new media sphere do not linger at a stable 
status but rather dynamically changed.  The current study is expected to 
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enrich the classic debates over online group polarization and to be one of 
cornerstones of new media study in political communication context.  
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In the last decade, online sphere has been extensively transformed while 
going through the other dimension of development.  The Web 2.0 idea 
where people can be more actively involved on the site has been 
materialized through invention of a novel online platform such as 
microblog or Social Network Sites (e.g., Myspace, Tumblr, Facebook 
and Twitter).  The advent of smartphone, in addition, have made people 
enjoy a true meaning of ubiquity in the social communication situations.  
Indeed smartphone widely contributes to a social media boom because 
information on whom people are interested in are accessible anytime and 
anywhere by technologies enabling the real-time updates.  Those 
upgraded online services emphasizing ubiquitous connectivity have 
attracted many people by its charm then it was a matter of time to make 
people socially wired from seconds to seconds.  The size of SNSs users 
are enormously exploding at a global as well as a local scale.  The 
number of the world-wide users of Twitter has jumped from 100 million 
in 2010 (June 2010, Sysmos in-depth report) to 500 million in 2012 
(April 2012, Twitter official blog post).
1
  Also Facebook is now 
reported that it has approximately 900 million monthly active users 
(Wall Street Journal, 2012).  The size of Social Network Sites' 
                                         
1 Sysmos In-depth report(June 2010):  http://mashable.com/2010/12/16/twitter-stats-2010 
 Twitter Official Blog post(April 2012): http://www.businessinsider.com/twitter-stats-2010-4 
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popularity seems to be huge but we should acknowledge that its power is 
more than such numerical influences represented by those big number of 
membership.    
 Social Network Sites undoubtedly have played the most pivotal 
role in changing our lifestyle.  It has exercised remarkable impacts on 
the events of the real world.  Also the performances in civic 
engagement through Social Network Sites are very impressive.  Most 
recently New York Times published a feature article about Barak Obama, 
a presidential candidate trying to hold his presidency, who outperformed 
in social media campaign of 2012 election just like what he did in 2008.  
As many scholars conducting researches about Obama's successful 
campaign of mobilizing voters by social media have reported (Aakers 
and Chang, 2009; Harfoush, 2009), his 2008 campaign created 5 million 
supporters on social networks including 2.5 million followers on 
Facebook, and 50 million viewers who watched 14 million hours of 
video on YouTube, finally which led to 230,000 events and $639 million 
raised from 3 million donors.  Notably according to analysis of New 
York Times, the 2012 campaign also built the similar results like the past  
and thanks to his campaign strategies he is re-elected as the 44th 
president of the United States  (New York Times, 2012).  
 Not only but the voluntary political participation of citizens has 
been affected by the power of social media.  Bond and his research 
team (Bond et al.,2012) claim the political mobilization message, 
8 
 
showing pictures of friends who said they had already voted, generated 
340,000 additional votes in 2010 US Congressional Election.  They 
find the message influenced the users who received them, the users’ 
friends, and friends of friends.  Pew Internet & American Project which 
is one of primary projects of the Pew Research Center recently briefs the 
results of the survey taken during 2012 presidential election campaign. 
According to their reports, 22% of social media users "shared their vote 
for presidential candidate on social media" and 35% of users "have used 
social networks to encourage others to vote" (Pew Research Center, 
2012).   
 In the political realm Social Network Sites never stayed in only 
local.  The Arab Spring of 2011 which broke out in Tunisia actively 
invited digital media to spread their messages while avoiding the 
government guard.  The savvy activists effectively used social media 
tactics in order to appeal to the international citizens who agree with 
their movements trying to overthrow the dictatorship governments in the 
Arabic world.  For example, the prominent blogger Mahmood al-Yousif 
in Bahrain tweeted during his arrest, immediately reaching to the local 
and international activists networks in @OnlineBahrain and 
@BahrainRights.  Technicians, hackers and even technology firms like 
Google supporting democratization of North Africa and the Middle East 
countries helped activists and citizens to bypass Twitter, Facebook and 
Youtube blockade of the dictatorship governments.  Meanwhile 
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individual activists scattered over the world collaborated by using social 
media to topple dictators (Khondker, 2011; Howard and Hussein, 2011; 
Howard and Park, 2012).  
 Amid this international phenomena - the social media craze in 
political communication, South Korea, one of the most wired countries 
in the world
2
 was not exceptional.  First of all, the number of Korean 
users of Twitter and Facebook amounts to about fifty million today.  
The rate of the number of social media users is striking.  According to 
the recent report of Statistics Korea published in the early month of 2012 
the size of social media use have snowballed.  In 2010 Korean users of 
Twitter was 632 thousand but it has increased to 5.44 million in 2011.  
Also Facebook users has rapidly grown from 4.01 million (September, 
2011) to 5.35 million (December, 2011)  (Statistics Korea, 2012).    
 In the midst of political events Twitter was standing in the 
middle as a critical player in Korea.  Particularly Seoul mayoral race 
held in October 2011 was at the zenith of social media election.  In 
2011 many liberal agendas such as policies of the halved university 
tuition or the free school lunch were salient while the demonstrators who 
are for those policies were spreading supportive messages through 
Twitter.  The conservative sides were threatened by such movement 
rises so three major newspapers of Korea which are allegedly 
                                         
2  Please see OECD broad band portal about the specific statistics of the world trend  
(http://www.oecd.org/sti/broadbandandtelecom/oecdbroadbandportal.htm)   
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conservative advocators proclaimed Twitter is the liberally biased media 
putting politics in peril (e.g., Chosun Ilbo, 2011).  In this political 
tension the incumbent Seoul mayor Sehoon Oh from the conservative 
Grand National Party resigned and the sudden vacancy of one of the 
most important offices in Korea was becoming a touchstone for the next 
year's presidential election.  The liberal candidate from Democrat Party, 
Wonsoon Park took the seat in the end and a political punditry 
commented Twitter was an elemental factor of his victory since Twitter 
actually mobilized lots of young liberal voters (e.g., Donga Ilbo, 2010).    
In this light Choi, Lee and Kim (2012) find that turnout rate of Twitter 
users was higher than not-users and they also carried a lot of political 
messages voting for the candidate they like via SNSs during the Seoul 
mayorl race.  Even in other political incidents of the last three years, 
social media especially Twitter has been considered imperative in Korea 
local politics (e.g., Chang, 2011; Shin and Lee, 2011).  
 Unfortunately despite of its importance in political 
communication, Twitter does not guarantee the bright future in 
democracy.  A liberal bias in Korean Twitter has been academically 
verified as the conservative printed media have continuously argued 
(Chang, 2011; Hahn et al., 2011).  Such an ideological imbalance in 
Twitter may lead to deteriorate Twittersphere so that Twitter would 
eventually fail to play a role as a catalyst facilitating a various 
information exchange among users.  Not only but this distinctive 
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Twitter's ideological imbalance, communication scholars studying  
online media have warned the possibility of ideological polarization 
mainly caused by intensified selectivity of information of Social 
Network Sites.  Political groups are easily insulated from their 
opponent groups since people are prone to avoid meeting others who 
have dissimilar perspectives.  Therefore the classic self-exposure 
debate of media contents use should be more discussed in the era of a 
brand-new media.  In this study, I will examine changes in ideological 
polarization in Twitter over time in Korea political environment by data 
mining and network analysis.  How different groups of people interact 
each other on the web will be mainly discussed.  The reason why I 
introduce 'polarization' as a keyword in this current analysis is that 
media and communication scholars have widely concerned about 
audience segregation by tailored media service and its detrimental 
outcome such as group polarization and enclave deliberation (Sunstein, 
2001, 2004).  I will examine how Twitter as new media altering online 
communication has been evolving in terms of audiences' political 
communicative actions and what would imply to the future political 
communication.  This study is expected to enrich the previous 
academic debates over online group polarization and to be one of 





Ideological Polarization in Contemporary Politics  
The classics of voting behavior studies in political science contend 
people tend to incorporate their preexisting views to political affairs.  
Campbell and his colleagues assert in the book 「The American Voters」 
partisanship provides voters with ‘perceptual screen’ (Campbell et al., 
1960, p.133).  As an indicator as well as a cognitive shortcut people's 
ideological preferences stemming from individual predispositions play a 
significant role in contemporary democracy.  Not only on micro level, 
but also on macro level do ideological differences generate party 
competition while creating beneficial tension of democracy.  Brady and 
Han note, in this vein, that “Political parties are organized around those 
differences, so there will always be some degree of polarization in a 
democracy” (Han and Brady, 2006; Campbell, 2006).  Voters can take 
full advantage of those distinctions among parties to make their political 
decision.  Therefore, there is little doubt that the both formal and 
informal politics are naturally polarized for this reason. 
  Pioneering political scientists, however, have raised concerns 
about severely polarized mass and elites although it is more or less clear 
ideologically distant groups are endogenous to politics.  According to 
Pool and Rosenthal (1984, 1991), representative democracy of the US 
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has been suffering.  Assessment of roll-call voting records of congress 
in their researches show ideological distance among politicians are 
getting bigger.  Abramowitz and Saunders (2005) conduct panel data 
analysis and conclude that mass public is also polarized.  The other 
relevant studies also discover polarization among different kinds of 
polities such as party activists (e.g., Aldrich, 1995; Aldrich and Rhode, 
2000; Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz, 2006)  Fiorina and Abrams 
(2008), on the contrary, refute the polarization arguments of the US 
politics and strongly maintain those approaches are mistaken.  
Uninformed electorates about politics have ambivalent positions on 
public affairs so the extent to which the mass is politically divided 
simply corresponds to the degree of competition among polemic elites.  
Some also similarly argue elite polarization is not linked with mass 
polarization (Fiorina, Abrams and Pope, 2005) and it happens only 
temporarily in accordance with institutional changes  (Burden, 2001).  
The key academic interest about ‘polarization’ of the western 
politics are threefold: ‘who are polarized’, ‘how much polarized’, and 
'why polarized'.  When it comes to the first question, Rohde and 
Barthelemy (2009) summarize the pattern of ongoing ‘polarization 
debates’ by introducing three categories of polarization – elites, mass 
and activists.  They suggest three polities’ development of polarization 
have been actively studied.  Han and Brady (2007), on the other hand, 
argue political polarization in only both elite and public is a yardstick of 
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measuring the polarized political realm.  As such it could be 
meaningful to study about who are polarized as heated debates over 
elites and mass polarization raised awareness of the value of political 
communication.  However, it is more important to introduce a 
substantive question in advance: why does polarization need to be 
seriously considered? 
As political scientists wary of the polarized nation constantly 
claim, representative democracy itself would be collapsed if magnitude 
of polarization is unbearably large.  Huntington (1975) argues that 
rising polarization in the mid-1960’s American politics generated distrust 
about government, as those who had strong positions on issues became 
dissatisfied with the compromising policies of government (Huntington, 
1975, p.78).  In accordance with the polarized public as Huntington 
diagnose, elites have become more likely to strategically shift their 
position to the more extreme poles (see also Brady, Han and Pope, 2007).  
The exact causal relation between elites and publics in polarization has 
not been determined.  Nevertheless the polarization of two over time 
could be last by a law of inertia.  To pursue rational discussion of 
citizens as normative theory of democracy emphasizing the harmonious 
and reasoned discussion among polities are a rudimentary element for 
healthy democracy.  In his infamous 'public sphere' theory Jürgen 
Habermas (1991) states “the public of ‘human beings’ engaged in 
rational-critical debate was constituted into one of ‘citizens’ wherever 
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there was communication concerning the affairs of the ‘common 
wealth’" (Habermas, 1991, p.106-107).  What is important, therefore, in 
communication of civil society people can be engaged in open 
discussion when the public share the common grounds.  Accordingly 
inference from such normative views of civic communication can be 
made that losing the common ground will shut the door through which 
people can enter the rational discussion.  Furthermore, as we think of 
Everett Rogers’s definition of communication, “a process in which the 
participants create and share information with one another to reach a 
mutual understanding” (Rogers and Kincaid, 1981), polarization that 
characterized as stressing ‘Us and Them’ will apparently prevent people 
from attaining reciprocal benefits from understanding.  
In addition polarization could make social costs highly increase 
for likely uncooperative actions of agents.  Many social science studies 
keep warning the detrimental outcomes of individuals’ selfish choices in 
cooperation situation (e.g., Hardin, 1968; Olson, 1965).  Price of 
anarchy (PoA) of game theory (e.g., Christodoulou and Papadimitriou, 
2005) and increasing social cost suggested in Coase’s theorem (Coase, 
1960) would be good examples for this.  Likewise Frye (2002, 2010) 
argues that political polarization has led to a “war of attrition” in which 
people have failed to agree on coherent measures to address the 
economic crisis.  
 In sum, polarization does really matter and thus whether politics 
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is polarized should be rigorously investigated.  These days as the 
western academia seriously consider, studies about Korean politics have 
recently started to examine whether polarization of the mass and elites 
are also true in Korea.  The recent finding of Lee (2011) reveals that 
representativeness of Korean politics seem to be at risk when 
considering the empirical evidences showing greatly polarized congress 
members in comparison to the mass polarization.  Furthermore today’s 
dramatic changes in communication environment seem to stimulate 
polarization phenomenon.  Many researchers have argued online public 
sphere is getting more segregated.  
 
Polarization of Online Public Sphere 
The emergence of advanced online media now refuels disputes over the 
fragmented online public sphere.  The new media capable of offering a 
bulk of choices to the audience has altered the media consumption 
landscape while unprecedentedly empowering users to a great extent in 
choice.  Nowadays users can actively join the chains of distribution and 
production of contents so that they are not anymore left submissive in 
terms of participation (Harrison and Barthel, 2009;  O'Reilly, 2007).   
In the same vein politically motivated users can voluntarily be more 
engaged in the current affairs and take actions in offline politics.  The 
feature of web 2.0 enabling people to make themselves possibly exposed 
to diverse views while markedly reducing cost of information acquisition 
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let society think of a groundbreaking change in democracy.  In spite of 
the rosy-colored side of online democracy as some scholars have 
constantly underscored (e.g., Gandy, 2002; Reingold, 2000) the actual 
political communication among the citizens discovered by a battery of 
studies are not exercised in the public sphere that we all might imagine.   
Cass Sunstein (2001, 2007) brings the term ‘enclaves deliberation’ in 
his book ‘Republic.com’ to evoke danger of the polarized online space.  
In the latest edition of his book he states “new technologies emphatically 
including the Internet make it easier for people to surround themselves 
with the options of like-minded but otherwise isolated others and to 
insulate themselves from competing views”(Sunstein, 2007, p. 63-64).  
The fragmented publics are reluctant to talk with their counterparts and 
instead, are more willing to deliberate within their own enclaves.  The 
in-groups ‘wall themselves off’ from the opposed views.  Yet, of course, 
the term is rather symbolic than empirical.  
Relatedly, a large number of researchers have found people's 
communication in blog and online boards are being polarized.  Adamic 
and Glance (2005) studying links of political blogs demonstrate political 
blogs had links of news media websites corresponding to their liberal-
conservative leanings.  For example, most of conservative blogs attach 
the links of The Washing times, the WSJ Opinion Journal or the New 
York Post.  Similarly Lawerence, Sides and Ferrell (2010) also find 
blog users are more polarized than either non-blog-users or viewers of 
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TV news, and they are as polarized as US senators.   Haragittai and his 
colleagues (2008) who investigate blogs' contents conclude that bloggers 
are much more likely to link to the other blogs sharing the same view.  
Krebs (2000) demonstrates even Amazon book sales follow buyers’ 
ideological status.  He showed the pattern of purchasing book is even 
bipolarized along with each ideological camp. 
 Why do people eventually end up reinforcing their political views 
and limiting consumption of information?  To answer this question it is 
necessary to look back on chronology of media development.  
Interestingly mass media has also been attributed to the fragmented 
public sphere.  The early tests of cognitive dissonance hypothesis (e.g., 
Festinger, 1987) report partisan voters tend to expose themselves more 
to the candidate or party they prefer (e.g., Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and 
Gaudet, 1948).  Most notably, intrusion of cable networks to the 
television news outlets heightened the level of fragmentation.  Iyengar 
and Hahn (2009) verify that the presence of ideological news channel 
increases the likelihood of consumption of the channel sharing a viewer's 
ideological stance.  Fox news, for instance, has succeeded in attracting 
the conservatives’ viewership.  The news articles labeled by Fox news 
is chosen by a large majority of the subjects whose ideology leaned to 
right according to their experiment findings.  Prior (2005) demonstrates, 
in similar context, discrepant consumption of TV programs 
(entertainment-oriented versus information-oriented) produce ‘divide’ in 
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political knowledge.  The comparable results are also suggested by 
studies on Korean cable news network (e.g., Cho, Kim and Kang, 2009).  
In short, communication technology which expands choices in selecting 
information magnifies audience segregation no matter what media type 
people would take.  Following economic law of cognitive 
psychological orientation people are prone to choose information 
palatable to them instead of consuming cross-cutting views which 
challenge their precedent viewpoints (Mutz, 2002; Wojcieszak and Mutz, 
2009).  As Downs professed earlier, average citizens frequently entrust 
certain entities with a task of seeking political information and this time 
ideological position is a good signal for them to find appropriate agents 
(Downs, 1956).  Then if this selective exposure and choice of 
information are inevitable in modern political communication is 
ideological polarization between two competing poles mainly elicited by 
selectivity an ultimate outcome?  And would the most recent Social 
Network Sites maximizing users' autonomy in information consumption 
aggravate polarization more than the past?  Lots of studies dealing with 
polarization issue have usually relied on cross-sectional data so that it 
failed to fully capture dynamics of polarization phenomenon per se.  In 
the next section I will look through the previous researches about Twitter 





Twitter, the New Political Medium 
Twitter was launched in 2006 and Facebook founded earlier in 2004.  
Their expansion in the international market has been in parallel with 
introduction and distribution of smaprtphone.  It took five years (2004-
2009) to record 150 million total users, but it hit 300 million users within 
eight months in 2009 (Economist, 2010, p.56).  The speed of growth 
was absolutely amplified in the period when the first iphone was 
introduced in March 2008 and started to be sold in 80 countries in the 
early months of 2009 (Apple Inc.,2009).  The present situation is more 
clearly showing why Social Network Sites conquer our lives.  
According to the latest updates about the co-evolving relationship 
between mobile devices and social networks (comScore, 2012) 
Facebook and Twitter users spend more time on mobile devices than on 
computers or laptops.  Twitter users use 2 hours services on mobile as 
compared to 20.4 minutes on the website and Facebook users use 7 
hours on smartphone which is 1 hour more than on computers (Forbes, 
2012). 
 In  this trend Twitter interestingly appears more distinctive 
from the other social media in terms of political communication.  
Unlike Facebook which is more personal and private network Twitter is 
greatly used as news media rather than the offline friends' network.  As 
Kwak and his colleagues suggested (Kwak et al., 2009) Twitter cannot 
be categorized as a social network in the conventional sense.  The 
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structure of communication in Twitter which based on 'following' 
scheme is rather a broadcasting system that let users transmit 140 
worded short information to lots of strangers.  The only small part of 
Twittererians like CNN or Oprah Winfrey accounted for 90% of all 
tweets  (Wu et al., 2011; Heil and Piskorski, 2009).  In other words 
ordinary users are exposed to mass of information they intend to 
selectively receive (Zao and Rosson, 2011).  Thus political impacts 
Twitter might have is different from the one Facebook might exert. 
Hence Twitter as a major political player has been widely studied for the 
latest three years. Indeed there have been the considerable amount of 
trials to demonstrate the power of Twitter in the political arena.    
 For instance, the prediction of election while taking Twitter as 
an alternative of opinion polling instead of the traditional survey sheets 
has been realized by a plenty of modelings based on knowledge of 
computer and information science (e.g., Conover et al., 2011; 
Bermingham, and Smeaton, 2011; Tjong, et al., 2012; Skoric et al., 
2012).
3
  A variety of studies over Twitter in computer science have 
carried a meaningful implication which social scientist might think 
noteworthy because the studies have kept challenging the obstacles of 
empirical methodologies social scientists have confronted.  A big data 
they easily cook with their expertise is a main source of computer 
                                         
3 See also Gayo-Avello's (2012) summary of the previous studies about Twitter's predicative 
capacity over public opinion.  
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science's Twitter studies.  An and her research team (An et al., 2010) 
for example, was dealing with 14 million audience members following 
news media accounts.  Bakshy's team of Twitter study (Bakshy et al., 
2009) tracked 1.6 million Twitter users of 74 million diffusion events to 
assess to what degree a certain user has a 'influence' on the other.   
 More critically, Twitter's network has been regarded as a 
fascinating subject in terms of operating a field study since Twitter 
virtually has the population-sized actors in network.  A cascade, 
contagion, diffusion and any possible network dynamics associated with 
information delivery have been experimented (e.g., Aral et al., 2009; 
Chang, 2011; De Choundhury et al., 2011; Lerman and Gosh, 2010; 
Romero et al., 2011; Zamal, 2011).  Some studies have tried to invent 
fake accounts to see how the picture of contagious political information 
would look like (e.g., Mustafaraj and Metaxas, 2010; Ratkiewicz, 2011).    
Nevertheless what is the most interesting about Twitter study of 
computer/information science to political communication scholars would 
be discussion over online public sphere such as political polarization or 
democratic divide in Twitter.  
 As a matter of fact, there are only few Twitter studies 
conducting specific researches about the substantive political issues 
except the predictability of Twitter on the election results.  The number 
of study about political polarization in Twitter is even more less (e.g., 
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Conover et al., 2011; Gruzd, 2012; Nam, 2011; Yardi and Boyd, 2010).
4
     
From time to time, the presumable ideological positions of Twitter users 
are considered a good topic for information science but it mostly focuses 
on how ideological preferences can be accurately estimated (e.g., Boutet 
et al., 2012; Mislove et al., 2011).  Notwithstanding the foregoing 
findings about 'homophily' phenomenon in Twitter could be good 
referable studies for the current analysis.  According to big data 
analysis of physics online media are evidently divided.  Earlier the 
scientists tried to map out the entire American users of blog and Twitter 
and they found the high level of ideological segregation in two media 
(e.g., Lazer et al., 2009; Miller, 2011).  Hence we could speculate that 
Twitter is a political new medium that inherits the communication 
environment of ideological segregation from the previous blogsphere.  
Yet whether polarization by political preferences in Twitter would be 
exacerbated in the future should demand more concrete theoretical and 
methodological backgrounds.  In the next section, for this reason, I 
propose two hypotheses regarding ideological evolution of Twitter to 




                                         
4 I will invite details of these four previous studies to discuss the findings of the current analysis 
in the last two section.   
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Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
Although, at the cross sectional level, previous research has 
demonstrated that social media could consists of the segregated enclaves, 
little previous research has attempted to document how this relatively 
new medium evolves over time.  Would the seemingly ideological 
imbalance on Social Network Sites ease over time as their user base 
becomes wider?  Is it possible that the extensively demonstrated 
ideological divide on social media only transitional?  Alternatively, is it 
possible that ideological polarization on social media may intensify even 
further?  Answers to these questions will have important normative 
implications concerning social media’s potential for providing an online 
space with meaningful deliberation.  In the current analysis, as will be 
described shortly, I assess two aspects of Social Network Sites’ 
ideological evolution:  (1) concentration  and  (2) polarization.    
 
The Concentration Hypothesis 
One of the potential concerns regarding Social Network Sites has to 
do with “ideological concentration” or the process in which a particular 
ideological group becomes increasingly predominant.  So argue that 
SNS’s have a tendency to facilitate certain views while leaving out the 
others.  More specifically, some suspect that SNS’s are a medium 
dominated by liberal ideologues.  Conceptually, the liberal ideology is 
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closely related to participatory behavior and political activism (e.g.,, 
Inglehart & Klingemann, 1976; Abromowitz, 1973; Levenson and Miller, 
1976).   Accordingly, the intrinsic features of SNS’s are highly 
compatible with their ideological beliefs.  No less importantly, a 
disproportionately large proportion of SNS users are young voters, and 
young voters tend to be liberal.  Such a liberal bias in Twitter has been 
seriously considered in both America and Korea (e.g., An et al., 2010; 




 However, it is possible that this imbalance might correct itself 
over time.  Jennings and Zeitner (2003) address in their longitudinal 
study those who used to possess high influences already in offline 
political activities are dominant online also.  However, the authors 
demonstrate as time goes by, the concentration of those who are more 
                                         
5 In the latest survey taken in Pew research center the size of liberal and young users are much 
more bigger than their counterparts. The group of liberal and young users (18-29 years) account 
for respectively 79% and 92% of the total Twitter users. It has been convinced even among the 
academic researchers. For example, An and her team (An et al., 2011) document a vast majority 
of users who follow the traditional media in Twitter is liberally tilted (89% versus 1%).  In the 
case of Korea, liberal media hypothesis is strongly supported by the recent findings. Chang (2011) 
documentes that on average those who voted for the two liberal parties’ candidates in the 18th 
General Election had 13 (Democratic Party) and 36 (the Democratic Labor Party) followers.  In 
sharp contrast, on average those who had voted for the conservative party’s (Grand National 
Party) candidate only had four followers.  Likewise, based on a content analysis of 2,660 
Tweets composed by 1,991 users, Chang and Kim (2011) show that a vast majority of Tweets 
(61%) could be classified as expressing liberal views whereas only 10% could be classified as 
expressing conservative views.  These findings strongly suggest that, at the cross sectional level, 
there seems to be a substantial liberal tilt among Twitter users.  Similarly Hahn et al. (2011) 
convincingly demonstrated a clear cross national contrast between the U.S. and South Korea.  
The authors’ results suggested that liberals made heavy political use of Twitter in South Korea as 
demonstrated in other previous studies.  Although, in the representative sample of Korean 
citizens, conservatives had a slight advantage over liberals (19.3% and 23.2%), when gauged by 




politically sophisticated in the Internet use is resolved.  Contrary to 
Sunstein’s arguments of strong enclaves deliberation which even 
possibly happens to ordinary citizens, polarization could be just a tip of 
the great iceberg of the online network.  In the other words, ideological 
polarization among people with different views could be only for the 
political activists' business since the average users have really no 
interests in online political activism.  
Furthermore, as taking perspectives from media economy studies, 
a group polarization in online space might need a reconsideration.    
Napoli (2011)'s recent project about the audience evolution calls for 
reinterpretation of Anderson’s previous work of ‘the long tail law'. 
Anderson’s previously argued in his book 「The long Tail: Why the 
future of business is selling less of more」 (Anderson, 2008, 2010) that 
summation of minor tastes and needs would outnumber the mainstream 
contents.  Napoli, however, contradicts Anderson's argument and states 
it is impossible for audience autonomy to be fully exercised in contents 
consumption.  Rather consumption is highly concentrated on a majority 
of traditional contents as we witnessed before in the era of mass media.  
Therefore, ‘self-exposure’ settings of online services such as filtering or 
sorting function would not be that critical matters.  It might make sense 
that individuals do consume contents in different ways at the beginning, 
but sooner or later people inevitably reach at a certain point where the 
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major contents are dominant as exactly the mass media age did.  
Accordingly, it may possible that ideological imbalance could be 
ameliorated over time in the near future.   
In summary, considering debates over the concentration of a 
certain group in online media the concentration hypothesis can be stated 
as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  The severity of ideological concentration on a 
given social network site is likely to increase over 
time.  
 
The Polarization Hypothesis  
Second of all, I propose a more essential related debate over 
online public sphere.  It is about social media such as Twitter will 
polarize ideological stance of users in online.  Twitter basically 
functions by the following scheme which let users autonomously choose 
the likeable newsfeed items among a plenty of options.  Therefore 
previous works on social networks provide a useful starting point for 
theoretical discussion of social media’s evolution, advancing our 
understanding of why dysfunctional and more polarized social network 
structures may emerge.  The classic Schelling’s model (1969) of 
residential segregation allows us to form theoretical predictions 
concerning the structural evolution of networks.  Attempting to model 
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residential segregation patterns, the author’s work starts off by 
challenging the common view that a strict preference for homogenous 
communities, or discrimination, is a necessary condition for the 
emergence of residential segregation.  Schelling’s path-breaking model 
(1969) assumes that actors only have a very small aversion from being 
connected to others who are dissimilar to themselves, whereas no actor 
strictly prefers a segregated network (i.e., explicit discrimination).  The 
author’s work demonstrates that, even with such a weak form of in-
group preference or bias, segregated networks emerge regardless of the 
level of aversion, suggesting that weak preferences against being a local 
minority in the community can ultimately produce stark patterns of 
aggregate level segregation.   
As in the models of residential segregation, network scholars had 
assumed the importance of “homophily,” or agents’ attraction to others 
similar to themselves, in driving endogenous networking choices.  The 
Schelling model, however, triggered a paradigm shift, by showing that 
the emergence of network segregation does not require such a strong 
assumption, namely the attraction aspect of ‘homophily.’  According to 
Schelling’s model, only a mild aversion from dissimilar network 
partners, coupled with a random selection of new partners, may be 
sufficient to produce segregated networks.  In sociological research, 
this pattern has been documented in a wide variety of networks, ranging 
from race- and gender-oriented segregation in high school friendship 
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networks (e.g., Moody, 2001) to value- and belief-oriented segregation 
in political networks (e.g., Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1954).   
Not surprisingly, given the similarity between residential and 
network segregation patterns, Schelling’s work on residential 
segregation provides useful insights into why segregated networks 
emerge and persist in online communities including Social Network 
Sites.  Accordingly, a few recent studies propose models explaining 
how Social Network Sites would evolve over time.  Most notably, 
Henry, Prałatb, and Zhang (2011) provide a network analogue to the 
Schelling segregation model, introducing a mathematical, Markov-chain 
model of network segregation.  As in the Schelling model, the authors 
predict increasing segregation based on a very weak set of assumptions 
where actors have no strict preference for forming ties with similar 
network partners, but are subject to possibly an infinitely small bias for 
cutting ties with dissimilar actors.  As with Schelling’s original model, 
the authors’ model analytically demonstrates that the persistence of 
segregated network structure of Social Network Sites is inevitable 
regardless of any initial network topology.  In short, the authors’ 
application of the Schelling model underscores that homophily processes 
(or a deliberate bias for forming attribute-close relationships) are not a 
necessary condition for the emergence of network segregation.  
Therefore, their findings suggest that segregation may emerge quite 
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quickly on Social Network Sites, even for very slight aversion 
tendencies. 
Moreover much online interaction can be characterized as 
meeting ‘like-minded’ individuals, leading to a fragmented public sphere 
(e.g., Shapiro, 1999; Stroud, 2008; Sunstein, 2001, 2007).  The new 
media technologies granting users power to screen out uncomfortable 
messages (Garrett, 2006).  More importantly the argument that people 
prefer to approach supportive over non-supportive information precedes 
the onset of new media.  As a means of minimizing dissonance 
(Festinger, 1957), the theory predicts that people would seek out 
information they expected to agree with.  More direct tests of whether 
people deliberately avoid exposure to disagreeable information, however, 
yielded mixed results suggesting that dissonance avoidance was a 
relatively weak motive for the acquisition of information (e.g., McGuire, 
1968; Sears, 1968).  While some controlled studies uncovered traces of 
motivated exposure to in-party sources (e.g., Bartlett et al., 1974), others 
did not (e.g., Chaffee and Miyo, 1983).  Even though people are 
psychologically attracted more to palatable messages it still remains 
debatable whether people will be more ideologically segregated in 
political communication.  Also, it may raise a question about which one 
should be blamed for bisecting users in online sphere.  Is it a matter of 
an individual psychological path to make a decision or a mere 
environmental effects of tailored media?  To be clear, I stress that I 
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cannot deeply discuss here which one exactly causes the polarization in 
Twitter.  The phenomenon could be mainly caused by either the only 
one factor or both.  Rather I want to focus on tasks of clarifying alleged 
ideological imbalance and polarization in Twitter.  Accordingly, the 
last polarization hypothesis is proposed as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2:  The severity of ideological polarization on a given 






I attempt to use a novel method for analysis of the ideological 
segregation in Twitter followership.  Since the rise of Twitter as one of 
critical political media, media researchers have widely tested Twitter 
although data availability is profoundly limited.  Many scholars have 
tried to predict users' political interaction by using the traditional survey 
method (e.g., Chang, 2011; Chang and Kim, 2011).  Yet the 
conventional survey retains a risk of generating misleading results 
because a random sampling of Twitter users are almost impossible.  As 
another approach, some take advantage of tweets that users are posting 
on Twitter (e.g., Gruzd, 2012).  The primary difficulty associated with 
this approach stems from the retrieval of large-scale data.  To illustrate 
this point, currently the only way to collect data on a large quantity of 
tweets is to use a Twitter-provided API.  Unfortunately, it may take 
weeks or even months.  Accordingly, most analyses of tweets examined 
either a brief time period (e.g., Adamic and Glance, 2005) or a limited 
number of issues (e.g., Yardi and Boyd , 2010) but this limits the 
generalizability of findings.  
In the current analysis, therefore, I estimate the political 
preferences of Twitter users based on their “followership” pattern.  
Here I basically replicate the methodology that Hahn and his colleagues 
established to analyze the same data of 2011 (Hahn et al., 2011).  Based 
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on the previous work of Hahn and the co-authors I am following two 
steps to get measures. The first phase is to build the network 
representation of Twitter followership.  The second phase is to elicit 
MDS scores of legislators from co-follower matrix.  Twitter's 
characteristic of following function is made a full use of by the current 
work.  Users in Twitter are mutually connected by ''following'' setting.  
If people want to get newsfeeds from whom people they want to be 
connected an individual user just click the 'follow' button.  This 
interface will allow the previous researchers to make an adequate 
methodology where users' political preference are inferred by ideological 
distribution of politicians they follow.  
 
The Network Representation  
As the past work showed, estimation of individual followers' political 
stance will be predicted based on followership.  The logic behind the 
proposed method in their study is that followership can be represented as 
the bipartite network which very similar to the roll-call vote network 
political science scholarship has suggested.  In the legislation process 
of American politics, legislators' roll-call voting to the bills have been 
recorded since 1989.
6
  So political scientists came up with the method 
which allows to build the relation between legislators and bills they 
voted  (e.g., Poole and Rosenthal, 1985; Clinton et al., 2004).  Since 




an observer's subjectivity might intervene in measurement it is hard to 
accurately estimate a legislator' ideological position.  However, 
estimation of individual legislators’ ideal points based on their roll call 
vote records provides its utility of accuracy.  As the earlier studies 
suggested the current work also identifies groups based on the similar 
pattern of legislators and users' followership.  
In Twitter a link between a follower and a followee is made when 
one party chooses to follow the other.  To construct a proper network 
for analysis this study presumes that there is a link between a group of 
users and a group of legislators when a user decides to choose at least 
one of legislators in Twitter.  To be more specific, two networks are 
linked by the relationship generated by 'follow' scheme.  <Figure 1> 
shows how such a bipartite network of Twitter followership can be 
drawn (see <Figure 1>
7
).  As shown in <Figure 1> Twitter followership 
and roll call vote of legislators can be represented as bipartite networks.  
When portraying the relationship between two sets in roll-call voting, the 
legislator circle A, B, C...D is linked to the set of bills (the circle labeled 
by the number from 1 to 4).  The existence of links between two groups 
rests on the legislators' voting decision - "yea" or "nay".  If the 
legislators cast a 'nay' vote to the bill, the link disappears.  On the other 
hand, if they vote 'yea' to the bill the link is made.  In a similar fashion, 
                                         
7 <Figure 1> is borrowed from Hahn and his research team's paper (Hahn et al., 2011).  
35 
 
an individual user can decide to 'follow' or 'not-follow' the legislators' 
accounts and the link made between two groups is up to the users' choice.  
 
<Figure 1> Twitter Following as a Bipartite Network* 
                           * (Hahn et al.,2011) 
 
Measure: Classical Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) 
After constructing bipartite network of Twitter followership, I calculate 
ideological distance among legislators in Twitter.  For doing it I adopt 
mulitidimensional scaling method by which computes theoretical 
location of subjects.  Here are several steps to obtain the ideological 
score a MDS method suggests.  First of all, the dissimilarity  
between two legislators  and  are defined on basis of the number of 
co-followers, so that legislators followed by a similar set of “followers” 
are closely located in the matrix.  I also adopt Kulczynski dissimilarity
8
 
                                         
8 According to the previous explanation, Kulczynski dissimilarity has its utility when the range 
of  varies widely.  In addition, Kulczynski dissimilarity is often recommended as an 
alternative to Jaccard dissimilarity, (Hahn, et al., 2011; Hubálek, 1982) another commonly used 
measure of dissimilarity.  More importantly the Kulczynski dissimilarity measures are 
applicable to binary data because it presuppose the distances between two objects can be applied 






which is based on Kulczynski similarity when computing the distances 
between two objects. The equation of measuring the proximity between 
two objects are defined as below:  
, 
Here  denotes the set of Twitter users who follow the legislator  
and  denotes the size of the set (Hahn, et al., 2011).  After 
dissimilarity of all legislators are measured, the classical 
multidimensional scaling method is used for grouping the legislators 
who share a similar set of followers.  Multidimensional scaling is a type 
of cluster analysis are given and in principal it bases on Euclidean 
distance when dissimilarities of objects are given.  Here I used STATA, 
the popular statistics package, for obtaining a ‘dissimilarity’ matrix.  
While UCINET or any other commonly used network analysis software 
are providing the function of MDS, STATA facilitates to obtain MDS 
scores with very simple command.  Furthermore it does not require any 
specific form of matrix data.  MDS scores can be computed in any 
number of dimensions but I only measure scores of two dimensions as 
the earlier work did.  What the past study found in the first dimension 
score of MDS I also discover the lowest dimension of scores identify the 
given legislators' ideological positions in Twitter.
9
   
                                         
9 It is also a conventional way to limit only two dimensions of scores for analysis in the 

































The follower’s political preference is computed by taking the 
average MDS scores of legislators he or she is following.  Subsequently, 
the distance between each Twitter user Tj and the mean Liberal (Lib) and 
the mean Conservative legislator (Con) are computed.  Also, each 
user’s Euclidean distance to the mean Twitter user (M) is measured.  
Then for each Tj, min(|Tj – Lib, |Tj – M|, |Tj – Con|) is calculated where Tj 
is regarded a conservative party supporter if min(|Tj – Lib|, |Tj – M|, |Tj – 
Con|) = |Tj – Rep| and a liberal party supporter if min(|Tj – Lib|, |Tj – M|, 
|Tj – Con|) = |Tj – Lib|.  Similarly if min(|Tj – Lib, |Tj – M|, |Tj – Con|) = 
|Tj – M|, Tj is regarded an independent.  
 
Sample 
The sample are members of the 18th Korean National Assembly (May, 
2008 – March 2012) their Twitter followers.  The analysis is limited to 
the legislators with active Twitter accounts who had maintained their 
seats from the beginning of the current term to the given data collection 
period.  I made a full use of Twitter's Open API for collecting data
10
.  
Next, I forged the proper data collection environment to crawl 
appropriate Twitter data through a clouding virtual server service 
provided by Amazon.com (http://aws.amazon.com).  The acquired 
Twitter API information (i.e., consumer key, access key) allows me to 
                                         
10 Twitter now opens API to encourage technicians to develop a various kinds of application for 
Twitter users (http://dev.twitter.com). 
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crawl all lists of followers who followed at least one of legislators in 
Twitter. To facilitate a data collection task I used python which is one of 
widely used computer programming software.  This program 
automatically computes the number of followers of legislators and 
matrix between followers and legislators.  
Since a test of the proposed hypotheses requires an examination of 
temporal change, a data collection took place three times.  The initial 
data collection (t1) was administered on September, 2010.  On June, 
2011, the follow-up data collection was completed (t2).  Lastly on 
March, 2012 (t3) data collection was completed where the number of 
users of Korean Twitter hit more than 5 million. In our data the growth 
rate of legislators' followers is remarkable.  Accordingly, the timing of 
data collection seems suitable for assessing the proposed hypotheses.   
   
<Table 1>  Number of Legislators and Followers 














At t1, of 280 legislators who had kept their seat since the beginning of 
the 18
th
 National Assembly, 158(56.4%) maintained active Twitter 
accounts.  This number of legislators' Twitter registration has increased 
39 
 
to 195 of 269 (72.5%) at t2 and 261 of 293 (90.4%) at t3 (See <Table 
1>).  At t1, 126,289 users were following at least one of the 158 
legislators.  The number of followers had grown exponentially at t2 
where 318,417 were following at least one of the 195 legislators.  























Analysis 1: A test of the concentration hypothesis and the 
polarization hypothesis  
I test vitality of two hypotheses by computing each elite politicians and 
their citizen followers' MDS scores and analyze change of polarization 
between two competing groups.  Initially I examine how users and 
politicians are ideologically divided in Twitter.  The visualization of 
each legislators' MDS herein presented provides a good snapshot of 
ideological distributions changing over time.  Two each dimension 
scores of MDS in the plot are represented by X and Y axis. (see <Figure 
2>).  As <Figure 2> clearly shows, two competing political powers 
(conservative versus liberal) are separated in two lowest dimensions.    
Legislators of different parties visibly line up in the first dimension of 
MDS.  The left side (negative value) in X-axis indicates a group of 
conservative parties (Grand National Party (GNP), Liberty Forward 
Party(LFP), and Korea Coalition for the Future (KCF)) and the right side 
(positive value) indicates a group of liberal parties (Democrat Party(DP), 
Democrat Labor Party(DLP), and New Progressive Party(NPP)).  Thus 
it legitimizes analysis can focus on the first dimension of score.
11
   
                                         
11 Note that MDS scores of legislators at time 3 (March 2012) showed different results from the 
previous years. Dimension two rather than dimension one of MDS is more correlated with the 
expected ideological distribution of politicians. Thus I employed the second dimension scores of 
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When looking at the distances between median scores of each party, 
legislators are completely divided along with their partisan membership.  
To illustrate the median MDS score of politicians of the conservative 
parties(GNP, LFP,KCF) is -0.1496 and the one of the liberal parties 
(DP,DNP,NPP) is 0.2634 in 2010.  Correspondingly their mean score of 
followers respectively are split in X-axis (-.01167 versus 0.2457).  
However, as time goes by, the legislators are converging on the middle 
and the gap between median politicians of two groups is getting smaller.  
For example, the median score of conservative legislators have shrunken 
to -0.0984 in 2011 and to -0.0025 in 2012 and the liberal score have 
fallen to 0.2561 in 2011 and to 0.1724 in 2012.  Also the size of 
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t3 (March, 2012) 
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0.0595(t2-t3) in the conservative case and 0.0073(t1-t2) and 0.073 (t2-t3) 
in the liberal case.  The average difference between two has changed 
from 0.0393(conservative) to 0.0405(liberal) during the last three years.  
Additionally legislators who had kept her or his seats for three years 
(n=134) also show the bigger tendency of converging on the middle 
point than going toward to each pole(26.9% versus 21.6%).
12
  In this 
preliminary analysis I discovered the ideological distance between two 
challenging parties has been getting closer across time.  However the 
mere comparison of legislators' scores do not perfectly verify the 
proposition that polarization of Twitter followership has eased over time.  
To confirm the result I take two assessments about changes in the extent 
of concentration and polarization (H1 and H2).   
 I first assess whether the severity of ideological concentration on 
Twitter has increased over time.  In doing so, I propose np (1 – p) as a 
measure of ideological concentration where n is the total number of 
Twitter users following at least one legislator at each time point, and p is 
the proportion of Twitter users classified as supporters of the ruling party 
(in this analysis, a group of conservative parties).  Accordingly, p (1 – p) 
approaches its maximum as p approaches .5 at which neither party has a 
clear dominance over the other.  Accordingly, p (1 – p) increases as 
ideological concentration decreases.  In order to test for the validity of 
                                         
12 To facilitate an accurate comparison task I computed the standardized scores of MDS. The 
equation for obtaining the standardized score follows the commonly used approach: 





Hypothesis 1, I examine the change in the magnitude of np (1 – p) from 
t1 to t3.  The result reveals more or less relaxed polarization: p (1 – p) 
increases across time in general (see <Table 2>).  
 As the table indicates the magnitude of concentration of 
followership in Twitter is found having the mixed pattern though it 
largely supports the previous analysis' result.  Especially the third 
column of the table indicates the size of concentration at the time points.    
At t2 the magnitude of partisan concentration in followership increases 
(0.239 →0.250) but at t3 concentration trend decreases (0.250→ 0.244).  
Yet it is the extent of increase/decrease over time is diminutive (0.011 
and -0.006).  Accordingly Hypothesis 1 which refers to over time 
increase of ideological concentration in Twitter followership should be 
rejected since the changes in the magnitude of which a certain party 
dominates in Twitter is very weak regardless of the direction of change.  
 
<Table 2> The Magnitude of Followership Concentration Over Time 
 
p (1 – p)` p (1 – p) n np (1 – p) 
t1 0.395 0.605 0.239 126,289 30177.2604 
t2 0.514 0.486 0.250 318,472 79553.7833 




 In testing the next second hypothesis (polarization hypothesis) 
definitely defining the operational concept of polarization is required.  
So far there have been a plenty of efforts to set the proper definition of 
polarization in social science studies.  Although there is no consensus 
to have been made in understanding polarization, the earlier researches 
may help to make a suitable operational definition for the present 
analysis.  First, DiMaggio, Evans and Bryson (1996) offer a 
straightforward definition of polarization, which is simply movement 
towards the poles of a distribution.  Fiorina (2005) also adopts a similar 
definition.  It is characterized by a wide dispersion of preference 
between groups.  In statistical terms, this rendering requires a large 
difference of central tendency (i.e., mean and median) between two 
groups.   
 Adopting this operational definition of polarization, one 
straightforward way of gauging the severity of polarization would be to 
test for the partisan difference in the mean (or median) MDS scores.  In 
doing so, I regress the MDS scores of legislators on a single dummy 
variable denoting the conservative party.  Subsequently I examine the 
changes in R
2
 incurred by the inclusion of the party dummy.  This 
captures the extent to which Twitter followership is polarized in 
accordance with partisan lines.  Therefore, a greater R
2
 change 
indicates a sharper partisan divide.  By comparing the amount of 
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variation explained by partisan divide at t1, t2 and t3, I assess whether 
partisan divide has increased or decreased over time. 
 The alleviated polarization in followership persists in the results 
of a simple regression.  The results show to the extent which twitter 
followers and legislators are polarized has reduced over time in a general 
sense (see <Table 3>). In regression on Twitter users' MDS score, R
2 
has 
diminished from 0.6466 (t1) to 0.5277 (t3).  Again R
2 
of the regression 
on legislators' MDS also decreases from 0.8223(t1) to 0.5321(t3).  
However how much R
2 
has lessened over time is dissimilar in each case. 
Changes of the followers' ideological positions are not as sharp as 
changes of legislators' MDS. 
 
<Table 3> The Strength of Partisan Divide Over Time 
 R-squared 
 Followers Legislators 
t1 0.6466 0.8223 
t2 0.5326 0.8078 
t3 0.5277 0.5321 
t2- t1 -0.1140 -0.0152 
t3- t2 -0.0049 -0.2750 
 
When comparing t2 with t3, as for the degree of polarization decrease, 
followers' cases are showing much smaller than politicians' (-0.0049 
versus 0.2750).  That is to say the polarization level of the follower 
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group has little change.  To some extent it demonstrates that there is 
discrepancy between elite polarization and mass polarization in Twitter 
as the earlier conjectures over polarization of offline politics have 
insisted.  
 To corroborate the result of a brief polarization test I also 
employ an alternative way of measuring the severity of polarization.  
As the second test of polarization, I assess the level of intraparty 
cohesion.  The distance between two parties captures one aspect of 
polarization.  Another important aspect of polarization can be within-
group homogeneity gathering near the poles of a particular political 
preference (e.g., Poole & Rosenthal 1997, Stonecash et al. 2003).  As 
intraparty heterogeneity decreases, members of the party more strongly 
cohere around the party.  In order to assess this possibility, I examine 
the within-party variance in MDS scores.  By comparing the within-
party variance in the MDS scores at t1, t2 and t3, I assess whether the 
within party cohesion has increased over time.  The results of variance 









<Table 4> The Strength of Intraparty Cohesion Over Time 
 Followers: Legislators: 
 VARLib VARCons VARLib VARCons 
t1 0.0806 0.0868 0.0492 0.1058 
t2 0.0823 0.0704 0.0532 0.0920 
t3 0.0859 0.1252 0.2039 0.2280 
t2- t1 0.0017 -0.0164 0.0040 -0.0138 
t3- t2 0.0036 0.0548 0.1507 0.1360 
F (H0: VARt1 = VARt2) 1.0403 0.6575 0.8566 1.3242 
F (H0: VARt2 =VARt3) 0.9177 0.3165 0.0680 0.1626 
 
Like the previous results the intra-group cohesion has also decreased.   
In other words, changes of the within-group variance has enlarged.  
Both of liberal and conservative groups reveal similar patterns.  For 
example, variance of the liberal group of followers has increased 0.0017 
and 0.0036 in two time intervals (t1-t2 and t2-t3).  Similarly, the 
conservative group of legislators shows increasing variance from t1 to t3 
(respectively 0.0040 and 0.1507).  Variance tests made about two 
partisan groups unfold that the intra-party members (followers and 
politicians) have been less cohered as time goes on.   
 Although variance has been evidently going up generally the 
conservative groups at t2 show the deviant result.  In gauging the level 
of variance at t2, the conservative groups in both followers and 
legislators show the decreasing trend (-0.0164 and -0.0138).  More 
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importantly, however, the over time changes are not significant 
according to F-test (two-sample variance-comparison test).  It means 
there have been little changes in within-group cohesion as the time 
passes.  
 In the current two tests of Hypothesis 2, ideological polarization 
in Twitter followership found diminished or barely changed.  Hence, 
the second hypothesis that proposed ideological polarization increases 
over time is rejected as well.  Nevertheless the previous analyses are 
still limited within a series of very simple tests.  So more rigorous 
examination is obviously required to understand over-time changes of 
ideological segregation in Social Network Sites.  In the next analysis I 
adopt the panel data in order to articulate whether Twitter has been 
ideologically fragmented or not.  Moreover, the panel data analysis will 












Analysis 2: Panel data analysis  
To investigate which factors have exercised influences over ideological 
polarization in Twitter I attempt to take a panel data analysis.  In doing 
this, I adopt KBS citizen panel data constructed by Korean Broadcasting 
System, one of the biggest public broadcasting stations in South Korea.  
KBS citizen panel launched in March, 2011.  Online panels are based 
on the past pool of KBS citizen panels which had regularly been 
managed by traditional RDD system.  The body of panels now amounts 
to approximately 100,000 members which have raking sampling weights.  
A KBS citizen panel has a profound strength when it comes to tracking 
social media users' behavior because it contains distinctive information 
of Twitter accounts of panelists.  This provides a huge benefits to do a 
robust analysis.  The summary of demographics of KBS citizen panel is 
rendered in <Table 5>.  The brief summary of demographics delineates 
characteristics of citizens who are following legislators in SNSs.    
Interestingly male users who are mostly college graduates and liberal 
consist of a majority of the entire panelists.  The male users absolutely 
outnumber the female users all the time (76.4% versus 23.60%, the 
average proportion of three time points) and metro residents with college 
degree are more likely to use Twitter to get newsfeeds from politicians 
he or she is following.  Needless to say, the proportion of liberal party 
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<Table 5> Demographic Composition of KBS panel data 




18-35 years 37.1% 54.1% 41.6% 
36-55 years 54.9% 40.5% 49.4% 




Male 80.0% 75.1% 74.1% 




Yes 58.6% 43.5% 42.9% 




Less than High School 11.5% 15.3% 15.4% 
Some College 20.0% 23.8% 24.5% 




Conservative Parties 21.8% 25.2% 23.1% 
Liberal Parties 26.9% 24.8% 26.3% 
Independent 51.2% 50.0% 50.7% 
N 490 1,107 1,427 
 
 
Taking account of those characteristics of panelists I built the model 
estimating probability of following one of legislators at the given time 
point.  The dependent variable is whether a panel follows one of the 
legislators accounts.  So it is a binary variable; if a panel chooses to 
follow a legislator in Twitter it is 1, otherwise 0.  The independent 
                                         
13 It is the same result as the previous studies about Korean Twitter users' found Twitter is 




variables coming to the model are as follows; the computed MDS score 
of each legislators, dummy variables of followers' party identification 
(the independent is baseline) and interaction terms of MDS score and 
followers' party identification dummy variables.  And the control 
variables are the basic information of followers and followees; the 
number of being elected as a legislator(Min=1, Max=6), gender of 
legislators(female =1), age of legislators, gender of users(female=1), 
dummy variables of the age group of users(the oldest group (more than 
56) is baseline), dummy variables of college education(college 
graduate=1), political participation index(Min=0, Max=5) and the 
weekly viewership of TV entertainment programs(1=barely, 
2=sometimes, 3=often, 4=very often).  Because the dependent variable 
in this model is binary, the normal method designed for panel analysis is 
inappropriate.  Therefore, I adopt generalized estimating equations 
(GEE) which assumes within-subject correlations of the repeated 
observations (i.e. working correlation structure) where the outcome 
variable is not normally distributed.  The GEE method is an extension 
of GLM (Generalized Linear Model) providing useful model which 
presumes the exponential distribution family (e.g., Poisson or Binomial 
or Gaussian).  As in GLM, binary variables are typically modeled as a 
binomial distribution with a logit link in GEE (Zorn, 2011).  Strictly 
speaking, the citizen panels coming to data are not time-ordered.  It is 
of course a panel analysis data of three time points, yet each year's data 
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panels are considered separately measured.  Therefore, the current 
analysis employs 'exchangeable working correlation structure' which 




 The first regression table displays the results of data analysis 
which include all panels who are following at least one of the given 
legislators in Twitter.  The size of panel has increased across time (490 
in 2010, 1,107 in 2011, and 1,427 in 2012).  The impacts of each 
variable on followership are various per time intervals.  The basic 
demographical variables of users and politicians (e.g., gender, age) 
significantly affect the possibility of following.  More specifically, it 
seems male users who belong to the older age group are more likely to 
follow one of legislators.  In the case of politicians' effects, how many 
time he or she has been elected as a legislator and his or her gender 
affect the followers' choice about legislators.  What is interesting in this 
analysis, in particular, is that political participation emerges significant 
in the last term.  It can be interpreted that in aftermath of Twitter 
insanity political participation finally plays a significant role in 




                                         
14 Even though a researcher may choose an incorrect working correlation (e.g., independent 
working correlation) GEE can suggest valid estimates of parameters and standard errors 
notwithstanding the selected working correlation structure is unrealistic one (Agresti, 2007).  
15 However how much users overtly join the offline political events would be a key factor as to 
followership is another issue because it seems to exercise a far smaller effect (0.0041, p<0.05).  
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<Table 6> Partisan Selectivity in the Twitter Followership - All Panelists 
 
t1 t2 t3 
Politician-MDS 
0.0354** 0.0120** 0.0115** 
(0.0037) (0.0024) (0.0014) 
Reported party support - 
Conservative 
-0.0020 0.00015 0.0048 
(0.0042) (0.0029) (0.0065) 
Reported party support - Liberal 
0.0028 0.0046 -0.0005 
(0.0040) (0.0030) (0.0058) 
Conservative * MDS score 
-0.0555** -0.0308** -0.0225** 
(0.0066) (0.0041) (0.0051) 
Liberal * MDS score 
0.0481** 0.0590** 0.1240** 
(0.0062) (0.0042) (0.0042) 
Politician- # of being elected 
0.0124** 0.0110** 0.0101** 
(0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Politician - Female 
0.0291** 0.0315** 0.0274** 
(0.00156) (0.0009) (0.0010) 
Politician -Age 
-0.0007** -0.0009** -0.0011** 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Female 
-0.0070* -0.0092** -0.0171** 
(0.0042) (0.0029) (0.0058) 
Age Group 1 : 18-35 year 
-0.0076 -0.0103** -0.0355** 
(0.0066) (0.0046) (0.0100) 
Age Group 2 : 36-55 year 
-0.0077 -0.00940** -0.0282** 
(0.0062) (0.0043) (0.0095) 
College Graduate 
0.0039 0.00509 -0.0011 
(0.0051) (0.0033) (0.0069) 
Political Participation 
0.0010 0.0011 0.0041** 
(0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0020) 
Entertainment Program Viewer 
-0.0023 0.0017 0.0004 
(0.0034) (0.0022) (0.0048) 
Constant 
0.0451** 0.0514** 0.110** 
(0.0354) (0.0120) (0.0115) 
Number of panel 490 1,107 1,427 
Wald χ2 1311.05 3057.49 3027.38 
Standard Errors in parentheses / * p<0.10  ** p<0.05 
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 The computed MDS score and interaction terms of MDS by 
followers' party identification also show significant effects on 
followership between registered politicians and users.  Most notably, 
coefficient changes of MDS score and its interaction terms are constantly 
decreasing.  The magnitude of politicians' MDS score effects on 
following has lessened from t1 to t3 (0.0354, 0.0120 and 0.0115, p<0.05).  
In this light, the effects of interaction terms also draw a reducing trend 
over time in general.  For example, the effect of conservative party 
supporters' interaction term has been weaken from t1 to t3 (-0.0555, -
0.0308 and -0.0225, p<0.05).  The reason why the interaction term of 
conservative party indicates negative values is that MDS score of 
conservative politicians are titled to left (negative side of X axis) in the 
lowest dimension.  On the other hand, the liberal party group has a bit 
different pattern from the conservative.  Between t1 and t3 the effect of 
interaction term of the liberal party group has gradually increased 
(0.0481, 0.0590, and 0.1240, p<0.05).  
 Next, I bring a set of panelists who have maintained their 
followership with legislator in Twitter for all three years.  The same 
model in the earlier GEE analysis is used for analyzing this committed 
Twitter user group.  The number of those who have kept their faith in 
followership is 441 at t2 and 326 at t3 (the number of the earliest 
followers is 490).  Looking into the last term's demographic 
composition of panelists, the proportion of the liberal group (26.9% → 
56 
 
31.6%), the metro-residents group (58.6% → 59.5%), the college 
graduate group (68.5% → 69.0%) and the young adult group (18-35 
years group, 37.1% → 39.1%) slightly have increased in comparison 
with the initial time point (t1), which means the liberal and more 
educated group of people have a tendency of using Twitter for longer 
duration.  Expectedly this group of panels are not affected by the same 
variables in the same fashion as the previous analysis of all panelists 
showed.  The effects of politician MDS and interaction terms are 
fluctuating.  The degree of legislators' MDS effect on following 
declines from 0.0354 (t1) to 0.0212 (t2) but it goes up suddenly 0.0755 
at t3.  The effects of conservative interaction variable also reveals a 
similar pattern.  At first, it appears decreasing (-0.0555 to -0.0528) but 
the effect becomes double at the last time point (-0.110).  Nevertheless 
the liberal party interaction effect has consistently incremented like what 
I found in the first panel analysis.  In the similar context, the controlled 
variables such as gender and age have affected significantly on 
followership as well.  I will interpret more thoroughly this discrepant 
finding of the last group of the panel later in the discussion part of the 







<Table 7> Partisan Selectivity in the Twitter Followership - Same Panelists 
 
t1 t2 t3 
Politician-MDS 
0.0354** 0.0212** 0.0755** 
(0.0037) (0.0044) (0.0064) 
Reported party support - 
Conservative 
-0.0020 0.0005 0.0107 
(0.0042) (0.0054) (0.0145) 
Reported party support - Liberal 
0.0028 0.00360 -0.00406 
(0.0040) (0.0052) (0.0121) 
Conservative * MDS score 
-0.0555** -0.0528** -0.110** 
(0.0066) (0.0078) (0.0128) 
Liberal * MDS score 
0.0481** 0.0656** 0.0775** 
(0.0062) (0.0072) (0.0104) 
Politician- # of being elected 
0.0124** 0.0147** 0.0153** 
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0007) 
Politician - Female 
0.0291** 0.0359** 0.0311** 
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0021) 
Politician -Age 
-0.0007** -0.00110** -0.00136** 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Female 
-0.0070* -0.00796 -0.0277** 
(0.0042) (0.0057) (0.0129) 
Age Group 1 : 18-35 year 
-0.0076 -0.0137 -0.0380* 
(0.0066) (0.0086) (0.0218) 
Age Group 2 : 36-55 year 
-0.0077 -0.0175** -0.0364* 
(0.0062) (0.0080) (0.0207) 
College Graduate 
0.0039 0.0101 0.0106 
(0.0051) (0.0067) (0.0161) 
Political Participation 
0.0010 -0.000272 0.00147 
(0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0038) 
Entertainment Program Viewer 
-0.0023 -0.00235 -0.00767 
(0.0034) (0.0044) (0.0106) 
Constant 
0.0451** 0.0721** 0.151** 
(0.0110) (0.0139) (0.0329) 
Number of panel 490 441 326 
Wald χ2 1311.05 1457.59 1192.12 
Standard Errors in parentheses / * p<0.10  ** p<0.05 
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 Until here the results of analyses that I have reported 
demonstrate that the severity of polarization has not been worsen over 
time.  However, the coefficients herein noted in the result table cannot 
be directly translated into plausible probabilities in terms of interpreting 
the findings accurately because currently I have used GEE method 
where the curvilinear shape of relation is presumed.  On this account it 
calls for more specified analysis in order to estimate each variables' 
exact effects on Twitter followership  In doing so, I made several 
scenarios for capturing more detailed changes in followership.  Firstly I 
fixed potential effects possibly elicited from the control variables.  I 
presumed the situation as follows.  I limited the cases of the newly 
elected(the # of being elected=1) male politicians(Politician gender=0) 
and the male(User gender=0), college graduate users(Education=1), of 
30-55 years old group(young user group =0, middle aged group=1) who 
shows the middle political participation(political participation index=3).    
I assumed TV entertainment program viewership is fixed at its mean in 
every case.  Subsequently I calculate the predicted marginal effects of 
following at each term.  To be more specific, I compute the median 
score of conservative, liberal legislators and all legislators.  Finally I 
measure marginal effects that conservative party supporters and liberal 
party supporters are following a legislator who have the median scores 
of conservative, liberal and all legislators.  This measures represent 
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values picturing ideological distribution of politicians on Twitter.  The 
results are summarized in <Table 8-(a)> and < Table 8-(b)>.  
 
<Table 8-(a)> Predicted Marginal Effects of Each Party Identification  
User → Legislator t1 t2 t3 t1- t2 t2- t3 
Conservative → Conservative 0.011 0.014 0.048 0.0031 0.0337 
Conservative →  Liberal 0.003 0.007 0.042 0.0041 0.0347 
Liberal → Conservative 0.001 0.008 0.034 0.0071 0.0260 
Liberal → Liberal 0.035 0.035 0.061 0.0003 0.0260 
 
<Table 8-(b)> Predicted Marginal Effects of 
Within-party and Cross-party Following 
User → Legislator t1 t2 t3 t1- t2 t2- t3 
(Con-Con) - (Con-Lib) 0.008 0.007 0.006 -0.0010 -0.0010 
(Lib-Lib) - (Lib-Con) 0.034 0.028 0.027 -0.0068 -0.0001 
 
The within-party followership is always stronger than cross-party 
followership as I expected.  Political segregation on Twitter is superior 
to the cross-ideology followership of Twitter users.  This clarifies 
segregation between people along with the strength of partisanship do 
exist as offline politics and the other web 2.0 cases have shown.  
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However, notably the size of difference between within-party following 
and cross-party following has declined across time intervals.  
 In the case of conservative party supporters, the gap between 
within-party and cross-party following has become smaller (0.008, 0.007 
and 0.006).  Likewise the liberal group also shows the weaken within-
party tendency over time (0.034, 0.028 and 0.027).  In short, 
polarization between the respective partisan groups has alleviated over 
time although the extent of reduction in polarization is not big enough to 







Many related works of group polarization have anticipated that the 
severity of polarization would be exacerbated in the future largely 
because tendency of people's selective exposure which quite intrinsically 
embedded in a practice of cognitive psychology (e.g., Conover et al., 
2011; Stroud, 2008).  The over-time change in partisan divide on the 
web has not been measured many times but a majority of scholarship 
could easily speculate 'birds of feathers flock together' is always there.  
As outlined earlier the ordinary users who are politically active are more 
likely to gather around a homogeneous cluster sharing the same 
ideological stand (e.g., Adamic and Glance, 2002; Conover et al., 2011; 
Gruzd, 2012; Adamic and Glance, 2005; Trammell, Tarkowski, and Sapp, 
2006;).  Sunstein (2001, 2007), in this context, strongly warns of this 
insular online communication of groups dragging the politics to severe 
extremism.  He also argues those who stuck in one group as for online 
interaction over the political agenda would reinforce their preexisting 
beliefs, which conclusively abets 'a culture of polarization'.  When we 
follows his account of online political interactions the rational 
deliberation the normative theory of democracy underscores is 
impossible more in the future.   
  In the meantime it is also not difficult to make a conjecture that 
the relationship between elite politicians and ordinary citizens would be 
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more polarized by partisanship than the users' network.  That is, online 
political discourse and interaction between elite politicians and users 
could only occur within a group in which people feel more comfortable.  
No less importantly, the public relation strategies of elite politicians are 
mainly planned to harvest more votes in the next election as the election 
studies in Dowsian stream have continually proposed (e.g., Hinich and 
Odershook, 1970; Erickson and Romero, 1990).  As politicians are 
motivated to keep a good relation with their potential supporters they 
willingly utilize to full extent convenient information technology 
allowing them to reach the public fast and effectively.  Indeed the 
Internet is the most efficient way to approach as well as appeal to the 
public.  As the previous studies of the Internet election campaign and 
politicians public relation demonstrates, after the rise of candidate 
websites, e-mail and blogs (e.g., Gueorguieva 2007) have been useful 
campaign tools.  Needless to say, social media allowing to 
inexpensively conveying campaign messages in real-time, is a perfect 
channel where politicians can make a good impression by uploading 
pictures or videos.  Virtually it has made also quite impressive results 
(i.e., Obama 2008 election campaign).  Among all of Social Network 
Sites, Twitter, one of the most popular social media today has been 
highly regarded as the most useful media for political campaigners due 
to its broadcasting power like the traditional news media (Kwak et al., 
2010; Tumajasan et al., 2010).  In political interaction between 
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politicians and citizens Twitter can be a great alternative that let both 
pursue proper political information from each other.  However, as the 
past literature have documented, polarization is revisited as a concern.  
At cross-sectional level, the obvious segregation of ideology on social 
media has been discovered in various researches.  Yet its temporal 
changes is still left questionable.  In this current analysis I cast two 
questions: Will homogeneity of groups in social media, be persistent and 
magnified?  Or will Twitter which more similar to the traditional media 
rather than participatory blogs encourage exposure of cross-ideological 
information coming from the current political leaders in the near future?   
For answering this question I test two hypotheses (concentration and 
polarization hypothesis) related to the conjecture over the evolution of 
ideological segregation on Social Network Sites.  In this section, I will 
discuss more deeply the findings of the present study and its academic 
implications together with limitations for the future research.  
  
Over-time Change of the Ideological Polarization in the Era of 
Social Media  
To illustrate evolution of Korean citizens' and legislators' ideological 
polarization in Twitter I track three years data of Twitter followership.  
I measure ideological stance by adopting classical MDS method of 
cluster analysis and compute its difference across time.  The results 
indicate quite fascinating dynamics  First, I find a clear segregation in 
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accordance with partisanship.  Most notably, legislators visibly line up 
in the lowest dimensions of MDS and their followers are also divided 
into two partisan groups (<Figure 2-(a)> to <Figure2-(c)>).  However, 
the in-depth analysis does portray a different picture.  In the tests of two 
hypotheses that I suggested earlier, the extent of polarization has not 
been intensified as the most of scholars has been worried.  Even though 
it is a little, polarization of two competing groups has been weaken 
during the three periods.  For example, R-squared value in regression of 
MDS on a conservative dummy variable has diminished (<Table 3>) and 
the within-group cohesion of two partisan groups have declined (<Table 
4>).  Also the domination of one party is found not to have been 
worsen as compared to its beginning (<Table 2>).  In panel data 
analysis, MDS scores of politicians which represent his or her 
ideological stance estimated by the number of co-followers are getting 
more weakly influential and the significant effects of interaction terms of 
MDS score by the legislators' partisanship have shown the lessen 
polarization over time (<Table 6>).  The further computation of 
marginal effects in several cross-party and within-party following 
scenarios also support the previous findings (<Table 8>).  To 
summarize, it is not deniable that a quite strong ideological segregation 
exists in Twitter but changes over time in polarization are not getting 
severe.  The findings of this study might contradict to the precedent 
studies that have examined a group polarization yet the longitudinal 
65 
 
studies examining over time changes have documented polarization is 
not substantially getting worse by time goes on.  Although there are 
scant studies on over-time changes of ideological polarization in online 
sphere the latest Yard and Boyd's group polarization analysis supports 
the findings of this current study.  According to their study, changes in 
cross-talk about the death of George Tiller in Twitter did neither decrease 
nor increase within the first 24 hours of data collection.  And they 
observed little change in relative opinion extremity as well (Yardi and 
Boyd, 2010).  No polarization over time trend is captured also by the 
past Internet study.  Most notably, Getznow and Shapiro (2011)'s study 
demonstrate that there are little temporal change of ideological 
polarization on the Internet.  Based on the longitudinal analysis of  the 
survey data the authors report there is no evidence that the Internet is 
more segregated over time.  They further comment " If anything, 
segregation has declined as the Internet news audience has grown 
(p.1819)."  Again the results of this current analysis that also found a 
little declining trend of polarization corroborate these latest works' 
findings.  
 However, some deviant results of the current study require much 
more concrete interpretation.  Despite of 'not increasing' trend of 
polarization distinctiveness of the liberal users in Twitter survive.  In 
two analyses of panel data, I found uniquely liberal users' interaction 
term by MDS score are increasing at all time points (see the fourth row 
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in <Table 6> and <Table 7>).  Liberal ideologues who predominate in 
social media are still keeping themselves from following the opposite 
party legislators.  When I computed the predicted marginal effects of 
the liberals' following by politicians' and their partisanship, relatedly I 
found that the liberals have a bigger likelihood of following the 
legislators with the same ideological position.  The predicted 
probability of the liberal's average within-party following (0.029) is 
bigger than the conservative's about four times (0.007).  In the analysis 
about the panelists who continued to use Twitter it also shows the 
liberal's isolated interaction in followership.  The group of the heavy 
users of Twitter who mostly comprised of male, liberal, and educated 
people are showing politicians' ideological positions has continuously 
played an important role in followership over time.  There is a slight 
decrease in the effect size of legislators' MDS scores and the 
conservative partisans' interaction term between t1 and t2 but they  
doubles at t3.  Furthermore, the effects of legislators' MDS scores as for 
the liberal group are significantly strong and they have increased over 
time as the initial panel analysis has bespoken.    
 The liberals' isolation in Twitter followership might demands 
more explanation. However, the previous studies can be invited to 
advance understanding of this group uniqueness.  Liberal ideologues 
have been considered decidedly associative with activism (e.g., 
Abramowitz, 1973; Levenson and Miller, 1978).  The foregoing studies 
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regarding personality of partisan activists depicted two opposite 
ideologues' locus of control.  For example, conservatives are seen as 
those who think authority compatible, while the liberal activists are 
described as those who opposed to policies that conflict with their 
egalitarian view of political participation (e.g., Levenson and Miller, 
1978, p. 202; See also Keniston, 1970)."  Therefore the liberals are 
inclined to protect the balanced receipt of information and interaction 
even from the liberal outsiders in Korean politics.  Not surprisingly, this 
coincides with locality of Korean media environment.  Notably  
alternative media account of Twitter provides a useful theoretical 
background.  Hahn and his co-authors (2011) recently demonstrate 
Twitter is to some extent an alternative source of news media which may 
substitute the mainstream news outlets.  In particular, in Korea three 
major news companies and three major terrestrial broadcasting stations 
have been known as conservative (e.g., Choi, 2003; Lee, 2004, 2008).  
Against such a dominance of conservative media in the mainstream 
news market users who support liberal parties are more likely to trust 
information instantly from their liberal political leaders in social media. 
In fact, those who are politically sophisticated tend to trust online 
sources more than the traditional media according to the past findings 
(e.g., Choi, Watt and Lynch).  Accordingly, in Korean politics the 
marginalized liberal are quite protective in forming more homogeneous 
clusters in followership because their motivation to use Twitter as 'news 
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media' is attributable to the wish of keeping social media as the last 
bastion of trustworthy and desirable news source.         
 
Discrepancy between elite polarization and mass polarization on 
Twitter 
As I previously noted in the literature review section, a polarization 
debates has been twofold as to the subject.  Some argue that both of 
elite and mass polarization are severe in American politics (e.g., 
Abramowitz and Saunders, 2006).  Despite of scarce academic 
researches over Korean elite politicians and mass polarization, it is not 
hard to suspect polarized and fragmented mass public corresponding to 
the elite politicians (Lee, 2011).  However, the current analysis 
reframes the perspective on polarization of online public.  I found a 
discrepancy between general Twitter users and politicians.  As I plotted 
change of legislators' MDS scores in a series of time (<Figure 2>) 
politicians have kept come to the middle . Also R-square has declined for 
three terms and its magnitude is quite big enough to reconfirm the 
convergence pattern (<Table 3>).  On the other hand, polarization of 
Twitter users' ideological distribution has not been changed a lot.  As 
the same <Table 3> indicates, R
2
 has seldom fluctuated.  A small 
decrease is still found in parallel with falling legislator's MDS score but 
the degree of changes is extremely small.  This might substantiate the 
conventional understanding of voters' ideological positions.  In election 
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studies, when predicting the results of a race the ideological distribution 
of the population is supposedly fixed or unmoved.  The renowned 
'Normal Vote' concept (e.g., Boyd, 1972; Miller, 1979) explains that 
normal distribution of votes is formed already but it only changes 
depending upon an idiosyncratic development of each election.  The 
ideological stance of a person cannot easily be altered as demographic 
conditions always outweighs any other factors.  In Korea, education, 
generation, and predominantly region are taken into consideration as key 
factors to alter the election results.  
 
The elemental factors swaying followership of users and legislators 
Besides of ideology, demographic factors significantly sway 
followership.  Fundamentally the effects elicited from politicians' 
demographic bases were found significant.  The legislators political 
experiences strongly affect Twitter users' choice.  The more they are 
experienced as a legislator the more likely Twitter users follow them.  
And the gender of politicians exerts some influences over following. 
Most popular political leaders and candidates in the upcoming elections 
are female politicians and they do have many followers in Twittersphere.  
For example, top 2 legislators in terms of the number of followers are 
both woman and the trend did not change for all three years.  Geuhye 
Park who used to be a popular leader of the conservative party GNP and 
Junghee Lee who also used to lead the most liberal party DNP are 
70 
 
always ranked as top legislators who have the biggest numbers of 
followers.  Ms. Park had been ranked as the number one at t1 and t2 in 
followership (42,685 and 107,352 respectively) but the number of Ms. 
Lee's followers got suddenly doubled at t3 (216,497 and 72,005 at t2).  
And younger politicians are advantaged by Twitter followership.  Also 
younger politicians are more likely to appeal to young electorates who 
has taken up to more than 60% of the total Twitter users (Pew research 
center, 2012).  
 As for an user factor, gender and age do have considerable 
effects on followership while a user's education level or media usage do 
not have any significant effects on following.  As <Table 6> and <Table 
7> describe, education factor interestingly does not exercise any impacts 
during three time periods.  This is similar to the recent findings of 
information science studies on Twitter.  Nam (2011) document the 
education level of users does not practice any effects on SNS political 
use whereas more educated people have use more the Internet (Nam, 
2011, p.93-95).  A political participation index somewhat emerged as a 
key factor in the last year, which can be translated that the offline 
activists have continued to actively use Twitter on a political purpose 
even after the not-committed users had defected Twitter.   
 
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Researches  
The present study as an effort to show ideological evolution in Twitter 
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with a novel approach has nevertheless limitations.  First as I only 
adopted the legislators of the 18th National Assembly and their followers 
as sample, political opinion leaders' accounts such as Wonsoon Park 
(Seoul city mayor) or Yeosu Lee (writer) were excluded in the analysis.  
According to one of the recent studies about Korean Twitter's power 
users (e.g., Lee et al., 2011) any of the current legislators are not 
included in the list of the so-called 'Power Twitterians'.  The contents of 
political discourses initiated by power users and in the meanwhile 
forwarded by their followers don not come from legislators, but from the 
prominent journalists or political bloggers.  Therefore the current study 
might have missed a big picture of political communication occurring in 
Twitter.com.  Yet the study has still its strength when it comes to 
novelty of methodology where a researcher observe the hidden 
relationship between elite politicians and potential supporters in social 
media.  
 Secondly, as this current study only dealt with followership I did 
not conduct any analyses about retweets or contents of users' posting.  
In Twitter study, a 'retweet' which is seen as an action of engagement in a 
certain topic of messages in Twitter has been heavily adopted as a 
parameter assessing intensity of Twitter use (e.g., Cha, et al., 2010; Suh 
et al., 2011).  Besides, some researchers have practiced a content 
analysis for redeeming weakness of quantative studies (e.g., Conover et 
al., 2011; Tumasjan et al., 2010). However, the primary difficulty of 
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content analysis of tweets is retrieval of a huge data.  Thus I believe the 
method of this analysis which rather concentrated on inferring the 
accurate political preferences of Twitter users would be the most 
effective approach concerning the current study's questions.   
 Some political scientists who have studied political interaction 
among voters for long time propose contextual effects also need more 
attentions in scholarship (e.g., Huckefeld and Sprague, 1995). On this 
account, casting one vote in election should be thought as a fruit of daily 
process of political communication in social network where people lead 
their daily life.  A political decision which regularly manifested in 
election, hence, cannot be ascribed only to individuals' preference 
structure.  Instead social network in which people are socially 
communicating with others on daily basis could be a main source of 
political information.  Likewise the social network built in a virtual 
society needs to draw more attention in the future reseraches.  The 
growth of the number people who are using smartphones in is 
overwhelming making the social media's influences over political 
interactions never ignorable.  Therefore, in the future research, political 
discourses in social media or similar kinds of online platform should be 
more keenly observed.  In the meantime the studies should be able to 
suggest new methodology capable of hybridizing the strength of 
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소셜 네트워크 사이트의 이념적 진화 
: 이념 편중 가설과 양극화 가설에 대한 측정을 중심으로 
 
오늘날 온라인 공간은 광범위하게 변화하며 또 다른 차원의 
발전 국면을 맞이하고 있다. 사람들이 웹사이트에서 적극적으로 
활동에 참여할 수 있는 웹 2.0 아이디어는 마이크로 블로그 
혹은 트위터, 페이스북, 툼비르와 같은 소셜네트워크 사이트로 
구체화되게 되었다. 특히 소셜네트워크 사이트(SNSs)는 
현대인들의 생활방식을 바꾸는데 중추적인 역할을 했을 뿐만 
아니라, 현실 세계에서 일어나고 있는 문제들에 대해서도 
지대한 영향력을 행사하고 있다. 그 중에서도 소셜 네트워크를 
통한 시민들의 정치참여는 두드러지게 나타나고 있으며 특히 
트위터는 한국 정치 상황에서 정치적 커뮤니케이션의 주요 
미디어로 활용되고 있다. 본 연구에서는 정치 미디어로 떠오른 
트위터가 온라인 공론장으로서 역할을 다할 수 있는지를 
평가하기 위해 트위터에서 발견되고 있는 이념적 양극화가 
시간에 따라 심화되는지 데이터 마이닝과 네트워크 분석을 
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통해 알아보았다. 국회의원들과 그들을 트위터에서 팔로잉하는 
일반 이용자들의 관계 변화를 시간에 따라 탐색하고 이를 
바탕으로 2010 년부터 3 년간의 정치적 분화의 정도를 
비교하였다. 분석 결과, 시간에 따라 트위터에서의 양극화는 
어느 정도 감소되는 경향을 보이나, 그 변화의 정도는 매우 
적은 것으로 나타났다. 또한 진보적인 이용자일수록 보수적인 
이용자보다 더 자신의 이념적 성향과 맞는 의원을 팔로잉하는 
경향이 있으며 그러한 경향은 시간에 따라 더욱 증가하는 
것으로 나타났다. 본 연구의 결과들은 새로운 미디어 공간이 
하나의 안정된 상태에 머무는 것이 아니라 역동적으로 
진화하는 것임을 보여주고 있다. 때문에 본 연구는 트위터 등의 
새롭게 등장한 온라인 서비스를 새로운 미디어 공간으로 
파악하고, 그 동안 우려가 되었던 선택적 노출과 양극화 문제 
논의라는 맥락 안에서 어떻게 미디어 공간이 역동적인 변화를 
겪는지 추적하는 데에 그 의의가 있을 것이다.  
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